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*Prinzipien der Metaphysik.* Von BRANISLAV PETRONIEVICS. Erster Band. Zweite Abteilung. Die realen Kategorien und die letzten Principien. Mit 43 Figuren im Text. Heidelberg, Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1912. pp. xxxviii, 572. M. 16.

This book comprises the second division of the first volume of a *Gesammtwerk* which has evidently been conceived in its entirety and is offered to the world as a system. It is thus apparent that final judgment and adequate criticism of the author's thought must abide the completion of the undertaking; only a tentative statement of it, on the basis of the second division, is attempted in this brief notice.

The reviewer regrets that he has not had the opportunity to read the first part of Dr. Petronievs' treatise, published in 1904. The analytical outline of it, which is supplied with the present volume, indicates its general scope: an introduction to ontology, and a discussion of the formal categories, with an Appendix containing the elements of the new geometry.

In the present volume of six hundred odd pages the author undertakes first the solution of the qualitative world-problem, that is, the problem of the qualitative-quantitative structure of reality. He recognizes three historically significant positions setting out from the principle of the absolute reality of the immediately given: extreme naïve realism, moderate naïve realism, and absolute consensualism or absolute consciousness-realism. The criticism of these three philosophical theories serves to introduce the fourth possible metaphysical attitude, which Petronievs believes he is the first one to advocate, and which he calls 'relative consensualism.' After an analysis of the immediately given in its fundamentals, the author proceeds to more detailed elaboration of his theory, reaching his conclusions, first by an analytic-inductive, and second by a synthetic-deductive method. The theory is then applied to the solution of problems such as the instability of matter, the immortality of the soul, and the values of the dynamic and of the static *Weltstadium*. In this connection the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann is criticised.

The latter part of the book is devoted to the 'hypermetaphysical problem.' In distinction from metaphysics, which concerns itself with the world in so far as it is real, hypermetaphysics, we are told, deals with a still more ultimate problem, and seeks to show 'how Being is made.' This particular part of his work Petronievs clearly intends for those whose metaphysical demands know no limits,—that is, for the distinct minority of the *Journal's* readers. The topics covered are substantially the same as those of the preceding sections, but the standpoint is now throughout that of 'the ultimate essence of negation,'—a term of which Petronievs has apparently made abundant use in his first volume, and which he employs rather obscurely.

What Petronievs undertakes is a union of Spinoza's monism and Leibniz's pluralism. The 'monopluralism' which results is based, it appears, primarily on the analysis of immediate experience beginning with pp. 65 ff. of this volume. This analysis contains the metaphysical heart of the book. In connection with the dualism of subject and object, which the author considers the most fundamental fact of immediate experience, he opposes the doctrine that the *Ichsubjekt* subsists in the pure Being of the psychic content, or else exists as a special, independently given reality beside the contents of consciousness. Rather is the *Ichsubjekt* a contentless, purely formal act of

knowledge, knowing itself as completely and undividedly present in the manifold contents of consciousness, and as ascertaining with absolute simultaneity these contents in all their existence and character (pp. 66-67).

Naïve realism, in both its forms, and absolute conscientism, fail to solve the problem of the individual, for they all stand on the basis of the absolute identity of knowledge and the *Existenzmomente* of Being, and are thus compelled to admit a spatial relation between the psychic contents of the individual (p. 117). Petronievics therefore maintains the reality of extra-spatial knowledge-points, on the basis of a novel theory of space, which is apparently one of the achievements of his first volume, and according to which we are now told (pp. 121-122) that discrete space does not consist of real spatial points which touch each other directly, but that between every two neighboring spatial points there is a third, *extra-spatial* point which touches them immediately and prevents them from touching each other in an absolute sense. This is a bit of speculative legerdemain which does for the modern theories of space what the laughing Democritus, with his void, did for the *plenum* of his pluralistic predecessors.

This theory of space is now put to metaphysical service, namely to the solution of the subject-object dualism. The absolute consciousness-realism asserts the identity of Being and consciousness: *jedes Sein ist ein Bewusstsein*. Now it is precisely this identity of consciousness and Being which must be given up, if the problem of the individual ego is to be solved. And the absolute consciousness-realism, although it apotheosizes consciousness, does not do justice to the objective reality of the conscious subject. For, to make use of the author's mathematical analogy, all real points existing side by side in spatial relation to each other must of necessity be *parts* of the same world-space. A theory setting out from such a homogeneous conception of consciousness can not, therefore, account for the individual character of the knowing and willing ego. It is with the purpose of solving this latter problem that Petronievics proposes his *relative* consciousness-realism. According to it, sensation and feeling are the two fundamental classes of psychic content: the two real transcendent attributes of the ego, on the other hand, are knowledge and will. How are these two sides of immediate experience to be related? Not in homogeneous space, the author answers. The real points of knowing and willing form two objective world-spaces, completely corresponding to each other, but also entirely independent of each other; and between any two such real points of an individual there lies a subjective space of psychic content (containing a sensation-space on one hand and a feeling-space on the other), which is entirely independent of the two objective spaces of knowledge and will, as well as from the subjective spaces of other individuals (p. 139). In this way the two facets of an individual's consciousness, as well as the immediate experience of different individuals, are related to each other without the sacrifice of the distinctive individuality of any one. Consciousness is thus no longer a vague notion: it is conditioned by a real knowing-willing nature, and from the presupposition of the real nature of the knowing subject follows the possibility of absolutely unconscious constituents of Being (p. 119).

It is along this line that Petronievics proceeds, aiming to unite monistic and pluralistic principles in a system of metaphysics that should do justice to, and solve, the problem of the individual. It is an ingenious theory, carried out in exhaustive detail, with limitless

persistence, and with a fearless readiness to face any logical consequences. It must be confessed, however, that the author's profundity is often purchased at the expense of clearness. The above skeleton outline gives only a mild suggestion of the elaborate intricacy which characterizes the book. One wonders, as one reads along, whether all these metaphysical and hypermetaphysical sesquipedalia are really essential to the solution of the cosmic problem,—even if the author's thought be worth the labor of mastering his language. In this respect Petronievics, original in so many ways, has remained true to the modern Germanic traditions of metaphysical exposition.

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*Das Problem der objektiven Möglichkeit. Eine Bedeutungsanalyse.*  
VON AUGUST GALLINGER. (Schriften der Gesellschaft für psychologische Forschung. Heft 16. IV. Sammlung). Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1912. pp. vii, 126. M. 4.

What do we mean when we characterize anything as possible? Wherein does possibility consist: does it refer to the possibility of judging about reality in a certain way, or does it involve the asserting an objective possibility? Is the judgment, 'this may be so,' equivalent to 'I may judge that this is so,' or 'I judge that this may be so?' And, if the relation of possibility is to be treated as existential, how does it differ from other such relations, as causality, necessity, etc.? It is with these questions that the monograph deals.

In order to solve the last mentioned problem Gallinger discusses the *Seinsverknüpfungen*, positive and negative, the notion of ground, ground of knowledge, reason and consequent. The author opposes *Ursache* to *Grund*, as referring respectively to objective and cognitive relations. While every reality has a cause, not every knowledge has a ground (p. 85). The object of possibility cannot, therefore, be an existential reality, for in the causal order 'possibility' has no meaning. Possibility is a cognitive category: to be possible means nothing else than this, to be motivated as partially factual (p. 92). From this point of view the author then discusses the various types of possibility, and the relation of possibility to negation and impossibility.

It is a clearly written book; the author's exposition is clean-cut and forceful; the material is carefully organized. The study, moreover, is another instance of the increasing interest in the problems on the borderland between logic and psychology,—an indication, it is to be hoped, of an approaching *rapprochement* between psychology and theory of knowledge.

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*The Genetic Philosophy of Education.* By G. E. PARTRIDGE. New York, Sturgis and Walton Co., 1912. 401 pp.

In this volume, Dr. Partridge has epitomized the educational principles contained in the numerous books and articles published by Dr. Hall during the last twenty-five years. To quote from the author, he has "tried to present for students and all those interested in education the main teachings of the genetic school as these are formulated in the writings of its most enthusiastic and strongest representative." To search through the more than three hundred books and articles in which these teachings are contained was no small task; the author has conscientiously searched out the earlier and less accessible publications as well as those of more recent date.